

**SERIOUSNESS OF INJURY AND RESULTANT DEATH VS.  
INTENTION TO INFLICT INJURY- AN EXEGESIS FOR AN  
EFFECTUAL COMPREHENSION OF SECTION 299 AND 300  
OF INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860.**

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**ABSTRACT**

*“Law's finest hour is not in meditating on abstractions but in being the delivery  
agent of full fairness.”*

- Just. V.R Krishna Iyer,  
in his judgement in *Jasraj Inder Singh v. Hemraj Multanchand*<sup>2</sup>.

*Complexities in understanding human mind manifests itself in a remarkable fashion in a murder trial where a judge is required to traverse the human mind of an accused via his conduct/action in order to ascertain whether or not the case falls within the ken of Section 299 or 300 IPC, 1860. Albeit, the gamut of the said provisions and how one should approach in a given case has been explained beautifully in various judgements, but it still boggles the mind of lawyers and practitioners. The thrust of the arguments advanced here is that seriousness of the injury and the resultant death are not always conclusive of the intention or knowledge of the accused. There is a pressing need to decouple both the ideas. Punishment is to be inflicted based on the mental setup of the accused, which could be intention or knowledge, and not by solely focussing on consequence of the act. Indubitably, seriousness of the injury and the resultant death helps in ascertaining the mental element of the offence but that may not be the case always.*

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<sup>2</sup> (1977) 2 SCC 155.

**Keywords-** *Intention, Knowledge, Murder Trial, Resultant Death, Seriousness of the injury, etc.*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Interpretation of law falls in the jurisdictional realm of the Judiciary. However, especially in the case of Criminal Trials, along with it comes the onerous burden of understanding the human nature and mind. These rudimentary inquiries could be aptly labelled as questions of fact, that a judge needs to answer in order to inflict punishment, correctly. These questions when sought to be answered by a judge, who indubitably is learned in law, the concerned judge would be required to grapple with some knotty questions relating to human nature and conduct. Therein he may be, left off guard to deal with some questions related to human actions, having no guidance. Seldom precedents would come to his rescue as each case, subject matter of a Criminal Trial, hinges on its own peculiar facts and factoids.

These questions would require patient examination from a judge of the human conduct, mostly relating to the ascertainment of certain basic questions on which the penal liability hinges such as whether the accused was rash or negligent, whether he had the requisite intention or knowledge, whether the act done by the accused was executed in due pursuance of a sudden and grave provocation effected from the other side etc. In other words, a proper study of the human mind is required to be undertaken, by the study conduct which is nothing but the manifestation of such mental set up. Any failure, while engaging in appreciation of such facts and consequently, the question of facts, might result in rendering the accused person vulnerable to higher punishment. Naturally, a heavy duty befalls even on the Counsel of the accused to detect the true nature of the case and thus present every possible aspect of defence that could be taken. Thus even the Counsel is under a duty to have sound understanding of human mind which willy-nilly could be understood only by its conduct and surrounding circumstances.

## THE THRUST OF THE ARGUMENT

Recently the judgement rendered in the case of *Anbazhagan v. State*<sup>3</sup> wherein Justice Pardiwala, beautifully enunciated the distinction between 1) Section 299 and 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and 2) the distinction between Section 304 Part I and Part II. These distinctions, as struck by the court, assume importance for the fact that, these core nuances of the provisions relating to the penal liability still seem to boggle minds of the judges and practitioners.

This study is not going to undertake the survey of all the important decisions pertaining to the discourse of Culpable Homicide and Murder rather it tries to bring to attention of the readers, a nuanced point which is mostly ignored by the legal practitioners and students.

It must be made clear that seriousness of an injury, which resultantly causes death, may in certain circumstances be helpful for the court to ascertain the mental element, be it intention or knowledge, of the offence. In other words they tend to coincide some time. But that may not be the case always and there exists a perceptible difference between the intention or knowledge of the accused and the seriousness of the injury that results in death. Just because by dint of an act death has taken place, that by itself may not be conclusive of the intention of the accused to cause death or knowledge of the accused that he knew that his action was likely to cause death. The liability is to be fastened based on the mental set up of the accused. The inquiry that must be undertaken is whether or not in the given circumstance can it be said, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused intended to kill or whether the accused could be attributed with the knowledge that he knew his act was likely to cause death?

Upshot of the said argument is that, the liability is to be fastened on the basis of mental frame of the accused while committing the offence and not by focussing on the seriousness of the injury and the resultant death. It is stated at the cost of repetition that intention or knowledge could be inferred from the seriousness of the injury or the resultant death, but that may not be the case always and conflation of both would result in miscarriage of justice.

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<sup>3</sup> 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 550.

Unerringly, the argument raised above could have confounded some of our readers, if not all of them. The later part of this paper would unpack some of these ideas with vivid illustration in order to effectually convey the arguments.

## **SCIENTIFICITY OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 AND ITS IMPORTANCE**

The allegation of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter the IPC) being an archaic legislation is made at the drop of a hat. But the argument that IPC is old and archaic has to be accepted with a pinch of salt. This would be clear once a careful perusal of the IPC is done and for that the devil, Lord Macaulay, must be given his due.

### **Gradation in the Scheme With Respect To Offences**

Once the survey of all the provisions is conducted it is clear that framers of the IPC envisaged a gradation in the seriousness of the offences. This could be understood with this flowchart.

1. Assault- Section 351 of the IPC, which denotes the *apprehension of use of criminal force* which would occupy the lowest position in the list of seriousness.
2. Criminal Force- Section 350 of IPC which defines *intentional use of force* to commit an offence or to cause annoyance, fear or injury.
3. Hurt- Section 319 IPC. Herein one should not forget that within the category of hurt, there would be various aggravated variations of hurt like Section(s) 328 which defines causing hurt by means of poison; Section 330, which defines voluntarily causing hurt to extort confession; and Section 332, which defines voluntarily causing hurt to deter public servant.
4. Grievous Hurt- Section 320, IPC. As mentioned above, likewise even in the category of grievous hurt, we would have variegated aggravated forms of grievous hurt such as Section 331, 332, 338 etc.

5. Culpable Homicide-Section 299, IPC.

6. Murder- Section 300, IPC.

The aforementioned scheme fleshed out would evince that there exists a conspicuous gradation in the seriousness of offence, which closely hinges on the *actus reus* and *mens rea* of the accused. From 1 to 6 it is clear that seriousness of offence increases. This is done to bring home the point that while adjudging a case, a judge has to be careful in understanding the nature of the act so as to cautiously gauge the *mens rea*, for there exist a gradation at every step.

### **Gradation in the Scheme With Respect To Mental Element**

Bare perusal of Section 299 and Section 300 would show that what distinguishes a murder from culpable homicide, apart from the mental element, is the degree of certainty of death which is evinced by usage of certain terms and phrases. For example limb 2 of Section 299 uses '*intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death*' and limb 3 of Section 300 uses '*intention of causing such bodily injury to any person and that such intended bodily injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death*'.

Another example could be limb 3 of Section 299 which uses '*with the knowledge that he is likely to cause death*' and Section 300 fourthly adds that '*act....is so imminently dangerous, that it must in all probability cause death*'

Dealing with the term '*likely*' and '*sufficient in the ordinary course of nature*' Supreme Court in the case of *Prasad Pradhan v. State of Chattisgarh*<sup>4</sup> held that-

*"The word "likely" in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of "probable" as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury ... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature."*

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<sup>4</sup> 2023 SCC OnLine SC 81.

Thus the upshot of the said discussion is that there exists a gradation in the IPC with respect to the seriousness of the offence and mental element in Section 299 and 300 differs in terms certainty of causing death and one has to be cautious in order to place the act safely either within the ken of Section 299 and Section 300. The Judge is under a bounden duty to ascertain the mental element behind the act in order to properly inflict punishment in consonance with the scheme of the IPC.

Thus here in it would be proper to summarise the difference between Section 299 and 300 by referring to *R. Punnayya v. State of Andhra Pradesh*<sup>5</sup>-

*“Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the “intention to cause death” is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300..... In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words “likely to cause death” occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature” have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real, and, if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which*

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<sup>5</sup> 1977 SCR (1) 601.

*determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree.....*

*For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.”*

It is here that we may refer as to *Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerela*,<sup>6</sup> which lays down the process as to how one should approach a case of death, to see whether it is murder or culpable homicide. The initial inquiry to be contemplated pertains to whether the accused has engaged in an act that has resulted in the death of another individual. The presence of a causal link between the accused's actions and the resulting death gives rise to a subsequent stage of analysis, wherein the determination is made as to whether the accused's actions can be classified as culpable homicide as outlined in section 299. If the response to this inquiry is negative, the offence would be categorised as culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It would be subject to punishment under either the First or Second part of Section 304, depending on whether the second or third clause of Section 299 is deemed applicable. If the question is answered affirmatively, but the cases fall under any of the exceptions listed in Section 300, the offence would still be considered culpable homicide not amounting to murder, which is punishable under the first part of Section 304 of the Code.

### **Seriousness of Injury and Resultant Death v. Intention of the accused**

This part of the paper apparently could be brushed aside for the simple fact that this pertains to the hackneyed discussion of the difference between intention and knowledge. Admittedly so, but its value is in great proportion. Hari Singh Gour in his 3<sup>rd</sup> volume, while discussing the nature of intention and knowledge opined that-

*“Intention and knowledge are the internal and invisible acts of the mind, and their actual existence cannot be demonstrated except by their external and visible manifestations. Observation and experience*

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<sup>6</sup> AIR 1966 SC 1874.

*enable us to judge of the connection between men's conduct and their intention. And this has led the judges to formulate the rule that every sane person of the age of discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own act”*<sup>7</sup>

However what must be stated at this juncture is that the said rule of presumption is not a substantive principle of law. It is a maxim of great evidentiary value. Glanville Willaims adverting to the said doctrine opined that-

*“It is now generally agreed in conformity with this opinion that the maxim does not represent a fixed principle of law, and that there is no equipartition between probability and intent. This was pointed out by Stephen, although his words for some time had little effect upon the language used by judges. Recently Denning, L.J., said: "there is no "must" about it; it is only "may". The presumption of intention is not a proposition of law but a proposition of ordinary good sense.”*

Further it was opined that-

*“Foster stated that every killing was presumed to be murder until the contrary was shown and this statement was unintelligently copied from one text book to another although it was contrary to the fundamental presumption of innocence. The heresay was extirpated by the House of Lords in Woolmington, which decided that there is no persuasive presumption of murderous malice and that when a defence to a charge of murder is accident or provocation the burden of satisfying the jury still rests on the prosecution. Lord Sankey said: 'if the jury are left in reasonable doubt whether the act was unintentional or provoked, the prisoner is entitled to be acquitted, i.e. of murder".*<sup>8</sup>

Thus Supreme Court in *K. M Nanavati v State of Maharashtra*<sup>9</sup> held that-

*“As in England so in India, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused, Le. it must establish all the ingredients of the offence with*

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<sup>7</sup> HS Gaur, *Penal Law of India* (7<sup>th</sup> Edn , Law Publisher India pvt ltd, Delhi 2009) 2391-92

<sup>8</sup> G.L Williams, *Criminal Law: The General Part*, (Stevens and Sons, London, 1953) 81.

<sup>9</sup> AIR 1964 SC 1563.



*which he is charged. As in England so also in India, the general burden of proof is upon the prosecution; and if, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution or by the accused, there is a reasonable doubt whether the accused committed the offence, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt”*

Thus from the reading of the aforementioned cited paragraph it is clear that intention/knowledge has to be inferred from the conduct of the accused and as pointed out by Glanville William the rule of presumption as to the inference of intention from the consequence is a rule of prudence not a rule of law . Further it is clear that the idea expatiated in CJ Ellenborough could not be considered to be apposite in all the fact situations. In other words, just because a ‘*highly injurious consequence*’ has ensued, it does not mean, invariably, that the act was intended. The prosecution is under a bounden duty to prove the ingredients of the offence. Intention/knowledge, being a subjective phenomenon, has to be proved positively by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. If in case there doubt is there, the benefit of the same has to go to the accused.

#### *Difference Between Intention And Knowledge And The Final Argument*

For here it becomes important for us to once again focus on the definition of intention and knowledge. The framers of the Indian Penal Code have decidedly used two terms ‘*intention*’ and ‘*knowledge*’ as both of these words connote different ideas. Intention is simpler terms could be defined as a mental set up where once person wants to positively bring about a consequence and takes action in pursuance of such mental setup. However knowledge is nothing but the awareness of the consequences.

Kenny in his book *Outlines of Criminal Law* opines that-

*“To intend is to have mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective: the noun ‘intention’ in the present connexion is used to denote the state of mind of a man who not only foresees but also desires the possible consequence of his conduct..... It will be noted that there cannot be intention unless there is also foresight, since a man must decide to his own satisfaction, and accordingly must foresee,*

*that to which his express purpose is directed. Again, a man cannot intend to do a thing unless he desires to do it."*<sup>10</sup>

Further Russel is of the view-

*"In the present analysis of the mental element in crime the word 'intention' is used to denote the mental attitude of a man who has resolved to bring about a certain result if he can possibly do so. He shapes his line of conduct so as to achieve a particular end at which he aims..."*<sup>11</sup>

In other words an act done with the knowledge that certain consequences would ensue is not the same thing that such consequence should happen. Mere foresight of the consequence is not something that will result in attribution of intention to bring about such consequence. Thus intention is a positive mindset which actively churns to bring about a particular consequence.

What is sought to be accentuated here is that the degree of offence and subsequently the degree of punishment depends upon the intention or knowledge. This could be understood with the help of an example. Suppose a person kicks another in the stomach and subsequently that person dies. Indubitably, death is caused but that may not be the sole factor which is to be taken into consideration to afflict penal liability. Here it cannot be stated that he intended death of the deceased. But if the accused had the knowledge about the enlarged spleen of the deceased and knowing that the kick is given, this would increase the penal liability as he had some extra knowledge about the medical condition of the deceased.

### The Final Argument

Indubitably the degree of offence, that is, whether the offence committed is culpable homicide amounting to murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, or Culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under first part of Section 304, or Second part of Section 304, hinges on the degree of knowledge or intention.

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<sup>10</sup> J.W.C Turner, *Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law* (17<sup>th</sup> Edn, Cambridge University Press, 1962) 31.

<sup>11</sup> J. W.C Turner, *Russell on Crime* (Vol 1, 12<sup>th</sup> edn., Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1964) 40.

First limb of Section 299 and *Firstly* of Section 300 shows that whoever causes death with the intention of causing death. Seldom cases would fall under this head and they are easier to prove. For example, indiscriminate fire on a mob.

The argument advanced above basically deals with the cases of limb 2 of Section 299 and *thirdly* of Section 300.

Intention is used at two places in Section 299 IPC A) Intention to cause death (limb 1) and B) Intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death (limb 2). Part B could be referred *thirdly* of Section 300. The distinction with respect to (between part b of Section 299 and *thirdly* of Section 300) certainty of death is highlighted above. However in both B and *thirdly*, *the intention is not to cause death, but to cause bodily injury*<sup>12</sup>. If it is showed that the person concerned, keeping in mind the surrounding circumstances, had no intention then the case would not even cross the field of Section 299. Then, the next inquiry that should be made is to check whether the accused could be attributed with knowledge. If answer to this inquiry is a 'yes', then this case would fall within the third limb of Section 299, that is, '*with the knowledge that he is likely to cause death*' and consequently he would be punished under part 2 of Section 304.

On this count it was observed by Justice Pardiwala, in *Anbazghan Case*(*supra*)-

*"The question is, was there any need for the Court to take recourse to Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC for the purpose of altering the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II of the IPC. We say so because there is fine difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC. Under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC."*

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<sup>12</sup> R. Jethmalani and D.S Chopra, *The Indian Penal Code, A Concise Commentary*, (Vol. 1, 1<sup>st</sup> Edn, Thomson Reuters, 2017) 1081.

Thus according to Section 300 thirdly, it is clear if it is done with the *intention of causing bodily injury to any person* and the *bodily injury intended* to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then it would be murder.

Thus herein it could be stated with utmost certitude that as a judge in such cases what is required to be done is to see whether the injury was *intended*. If the defence can demonstrate that the accused, as a result of an intervening circumstance, either unintentionally (or accidentally) or due to some mitigating factor, such as being subjected to verbal abuse, caused harm to the victim, it would not be appropriate to conclude that the accused is guilty of the offence of murder. In either scenario, it is evident that the accused cannot be ascribed with the intention to inflict such injury or the intention to cause death. At least, what could be attributed is the knowledge.

We may here profitably refer to the case of Jagrup Singh v State of Haryana<sup>13</sup>-

“The whole thing depends upon the intention to cause death, and the case may be covered by either clause 1stly or clause 3rdly (of section 300). The nature of intention must be gathered from the kind of weapon used, the part of the body hit, the amount of force employed and the circumstances attendant upon the death”

Now we may here refer to the *locus classicus* on the said issue, that is, the case of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab<sup>14</sup>. Justice Vivian Bose pithily opined that-

“23. ... With due respect to the learned Judge he has linked up the intent required with the seriousness of the injury, and that, as we have shown, is not what the section requires. The two matters are quite separate and distinct, though the evidence about them may sometimes overlap.”

What essentially was held in the case was the inquiry pertains not to the accused's intention to cause a serious or trivial injury, but rather to their *intention* to cause the specific injury that has been established. If the individual is able to provide evidence

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<sup>13</sup> 1981 3 SCC 616.

<sup>14</sup> 1958 SCR 1495.

that he did not commit the act in question, or if the overall circumstances support such a conclusion, then it can be argued that the required intent specified in the section has not been proven. The primary focus of inquiry is not centred on the accused's intention to cause death or a specific level of harm, but rather on whether the intention was to cause the specific injury in question. However, the presence of intention is a question of fact not a question of law.

The determination of the severity of a wound, regardless of whether it is serious or not, is an entirely separate matter from the question of whether the accused had the intention to cause the specific injury.

To buttress the argument we may refer to a few decided cases of the Supreme Court of India, to show that the inquiry should relate to the mental setup of the accused and not the severity of injury or consequence of death. In cases where a single blow or even multiple blows with not so deadly weapon, is given due to provocation or on abuses being hurled or on sudden fight, it could not be said that the accused could have the mental balance to consciously want to bring about a consequence. At most what could be attributed to such person is knowledge. Supreme Court of India, after doing a survey of several cases of the similar nature as highlighted above where the blows are given due to some provocation held that<sup>15</sup>-

*“The Supreme Court took into consideration the circumstances such as sudden quarrel, grappling etc. as mentioned above only to assess the state of mind namely whether the accused had the necessary intention to cause that particular injury i.e. to say that he desired expressly that such injury only should be the result. It is held in all these cases that there was no such intention to cause that particular injury as in those circumstances, the accused could have been barely aware i.e. only had knowledge of the consequences. These circumstances under which the appellant happened to inflict the injury it is felt or at least a doubt arose that all his mental faculties could not have been roused as to form an intention to achieve the particular result. We may point out that we are not concerned with*

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<sup>15</sup> *Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Admin.)*, (1991) 2 SCC 32; *Chamru v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, AIR 1954 SC 652; *Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab*, (1981) 4 SCC 245; *In Hem Raj v. State (Delhi Admn.)*, 1990 Supp SCC 29.

*the intention to cause death in which case it will be a murder simplicitor.....”*

In another case<sup>16</sup> the accused swore people outside the deceased's residence. The deceased walked out of his house and told the accused to go and not use foul words around women. The accused questioned the deceased's right to order him out. The accused fatally stabbed the dead in the right chest during the fight. The accused was found guilty under Section 304 Part II but not Section 302.

The factors considered by the Court in this case were as follows: (i) There was no established connection between the accused and the deceased, and the presence of the deceased at the time of the incident was purely accidental. (ii) The altercation between the accused and the deceased occurred spontaneously, and the accused struck a single blow out of anger after the deceased asked him to leave the location. (iii) The necessary intention to cause harm could not be attributed to the accused, as there was no evidence suggesting that the accused intended for the blow to land specifically on the right side of the chest, which ultimately resulted in a fatal injury.

In the case of *Willie (William) Slaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh*<sup>17</sup>, a similar situation occurred where a sudden quarrel resulted in an exchange of verbal insults, and in the heat of the moment, a single blow with a hockey stick was inflicted on the head. The Court determined that this act constituted culpable homicide falling short of murder, as defined in Section 304, Part II of the law, and was therefore subject to punishment.

All these cases would go on to demonstrate the point that, the surrounding circumstances within which such event of death took place plays a pivotal role in ascertaining whether or not the accused carried the mental element of intention or knowledge. The circumstances surrounding the appellant's actions raise doubts regarding their mental capacity to develop an intention to attain the specific outcome of inflicting the injury.

At last before parting, we may refer to a recent Supreme Court judgement rendered on 1<sup>st</sup> of August, 2023, just eleven days after the judgement of

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<sup>16</sup> *Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu*, AIR 1984 SC 759.

<sup>17</sup> AIR 1956 SC 116.

*Anbazaghan(supra)* was rendered, which failed to follow the settled law. Interestingly enough the author of the *Anbazaghan (supra)* was also a part of the bench.

In this case<sup>18</sup>, the assailant-mother had a strained relationship with the deceased-husband. Bickering(s) were a commonplace and thus they used to live separately. One day when the assailant went to the deceased to ask for some money for their daughter as she wanted to go for NCC camp. Arguments ensued, as usual, and during the course of the altercation the assailant picked up a stick lying nearby and gave blows (The judgement does not specify the number of blows. It simply uses the term 'blows'. Indubitably it is clear that, insofar the attribution of knowledge is concerned, some serious doubt could have been raised by the defence. Thus if two interpretation are possible from the evidence, such interpretation be chosen, which benefits the accused) on the head of the accused.

In this case, inexplicably, the learned judges attributed intention to convict and extended the benefit of exception 1, that is sudden and grave provocation, which is nothing but a distortion of the line of legal reasoning of the Supreme Court. Even in this it could be said that, due to the fight and altercation, convict intended to bring about a consequence, that is death of the accused.

Further it is argued that, in this case keeping in mind the nature of the weapon, which is a stick and number of blows (which is unclear) even though on a vital part of the body, it cannot said or proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offender knew that by those strokes of stick, that death was the likely result. In other words, even no knowledge could be attributed. Thus this case was fit for conviction under Section 323 of the IPC, that is, voluntarily causing hurt.

## CONCLUSION

The primary contention put out in this discourse is that the severity of the harm inflicted and the subsequent loss of life do not always serve as definitive evidence of the accused's purpose or awareness. The imposition of punishment

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<sup>18</sup> *Nirmala Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh*, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 585.

should be determined by the mental state of the accused, such as their intention or knowledge, rather than just focusing on the outcome of the action. The Supreme Court considered circumstances, such as sudden quarrel and grappling, solely for the purpose of evaluating the accused's mental state. Specifically, the court sought to determine whether the accused possessed the requisite intention to cause the specific injury in question, indicating a clear and deliberate desire for such injury to be the outcome. In all of these instances, it was established that there was no explicit intention to cause the specific injury in question. Rather, it can be argued that the accused had only a limited awareness or understanding of the potential repercussions in that particular circumstance. The circumstances surrounding the appellant's actions raise doubts regarding their mental capacity to develop an intention to attain the specific outcome, suggesting that their mental faculties may not have been fully engaged.